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Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
The decision about whether to start a family within a partnership can be viewed as a 
result of an interaction process. The influence of each of the partners in a couple differs 
depending on their individual preferences and intentions towards having children. Both 
of the partners additionally influence each other’s fertility intentions and preferences.   
 
OBJECTIVE 
We specify, estimate, and test a model that examines the decision about whether to have 
a child as a choice that is made jointly by the two partners. The transition to the birth of 
a (further) child is investigated with the  explicit consideration of both  the female 
partner and the male partner in the partnership context. 
 
METHODS 
An approach for modelling the interactive influences of the two actors in the decision-
making process was proposed. A trivariate distribution consisting of both the female 
and the male partners’ fertility intentions, as well as the joint generative decision, was 
modelled. A multivariate non-linear probit model was chosen and the problem of 
identification  in estimating  the relative effects of the actors was resolved. These 
parameters  were  used to assess the relative importance of each of the partners’ 
intentions in the decision. We carried out the analysis with MPLUS. Data from the 
panel of intimate relationships and family dynamics (pairfam) was used to estimate the 
model. 
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RESULTS 
The biographical context of each of the partners in relation to their own as well as to 
their partner’s fertility intentions was found to be of considerable importance. Of the 
significant individual and partner effects,  the male partner  was shown to have the 
greater influence. But the female partner was found to have stronger parameters overall 
and she ultimately has a veto power in the couple’s final decision. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
When we look at the literature on family formation and expansion, we find different 
lines of research. One of these lines focuses on the influence of socio-economic factors. 
Most  of the empirical  studies  on this topic  examine  the transition to  parenthood 
exclusively from the perspective of women. There are only a few studies that also take 
into account the perspectives  of the male partners.  Researchers have defended this 
practice,  arguing  that the degree  of agreement between the man and the woman  is 
sufficiently high  that  there is no need to  analyse the  responses  of  both partners. 
Moreover, the few studies that do take the features of the male partner into account only 
focus on the level of education or on the employment status of the man (Kreyenfeld 
2002; Oppenheimer and  Lewin  1999; Thomson and  Hoem  1998).  However,  the 
decision to start a family and have children is usually not associated with changes in the 
male partner’s life. 
There are relatively few studies that have examined the reproductive behaviour of 
men, and those that have looked at this issue have done so at a rudimentary level only. 
Over the past decade, several studies have analysed the transition to fatherhood. The 
results  of this research  showed  that occupational-biographical factors influence the 
transition to fatherhood. Occupational uncertainties—such as extended training phases, 
career interruptions, and self-employment—negatively influence the fertility behaviour 
of  men.  Having an adequate  financial basis is a pre-condition for the  transition to 
parenthood among men (Tölke and Diewald 2003a). While these authors agree that the 
woman’s influence is as important as the  man’s influence in the transition to 
parenthood,  not  all  of these studies considered  the partner.  Moreover,  it  is unclear 
whether individual factors that influence the fertility decision have the same weight as 
factors at the partnership level.  
Although the decision to become a parent is usually  made in the context of a 
partnership, studies that explicitly take a dyadic perspective are rare (see, e.g., Corijn et 
al. 1996; Sørenson 1989; Yang 1993; Klein 2003; Kurz 2005). The existing studies that 
have taken this perspective  mainly considered  the influence of the  socio-economic Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 63 
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characteristics of the two partners on the generative behaviour:  Gebel  and  Gisecke 
(2009) and Kurz (2005) focused  on the  partner’s occupation and labour market 
participation; Bauer and Jacob (2010), Kreyenfeld (2002), Kreyenfeld and Konietzka 
(2008), Kreyenfeld (2010), and Wirth (2007) focused on education and the educational 
constellation; and Croijn et al. (1996) focused on religiosity. These studies showed that 
the  effects  of  individual factors—such  as  education, professional position,  and 
employment status—differed based on the level of the partnership and the life courses 
of the partners.  
Another line of research investigates the topic in an international context, looking 
at the fertility desires, intentions, and preferences of the two partners. The results of 
these studies have also shown that the individual fertility intentions of women and men 
contribute to fertility decision-making in partnerships (Beckman 1984; Miller and Pasta 
1994, 1996; Thomson 1997). According to this research, the rules of decision-making 
of the partners determines the fertility outcome. The birth of a child could be the result 
of consensus in a couple, or it could be the result of only the female partner’s or only 
the male partner’s intentions. But the few empirical studies on this topic have generated 
inconsistent findings. Older studies have shown that the female partner is the dominant 
decision-maker. In a partnership, it is the woman—not the man—who has the power to 
veto the idea of having a child. A study of American couples showed that the wife’s 
decision had greater weight than the husband’s (Townes et al. 1980). 
Beckman  (1984)  reported  that  the  wife’s  preference  has a  stronger effect on 
pregnancy and birth than the husband’s, especially if the wife does not want to have a 
child. In addition, a number of more recent studies have shown that the preference of 
each of the partners is equally likely to influence the probability of having a child. 
Furthermore, they discovered that both of the partners have the power to veto the idea 
of having a child, which can lead to a partnership without children. These results were 
based  on survey data from  the US (Thomson 1997), Sweden (Thomson and  Hoem 
1998), the Netherlands (Jansen and Lifbroer 2006), and Germany (Bauer and Kneip 
2013).  In previous studies, Pavetic  (2009) and Stein and Pavetic  (2011, 2013) 
concluded that the preference of each of the partners has an equal influence on the 
subsequent fertility decision, but that the woman has more influence in the bargaining 
process.  
 
 
2. Theoretical considerations regarding the fertility decision-making 
process of couples 
The decision about whether to have a child is based on a complex interaction process 
which includes mutually influential powers of control wielded by both of the partners. Stein, Willen & Pavetic: Couples’ decision making on fertility 
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This interaction process may involve either mutual confirmation when the preferences 
of the partners converge, or an adjustment of individual interests to those of the partner 
when the preferences of the partners diverge  (Borchardt  and  Stöbel-Richter 2004). 
Actors who disagree may apply different rules when seeking to make a joint decision 
(Thomson et al. 1990; Croijn et. al. 1996; Jansen and Lifbroer 2006; Bauer and Kneip 
2013). The decision can be made by either the female or the male partner. There are 
several different rules of decision-making. When the “egalitarian rule” (Thomson et al. 
1990; Croijn et. al. 1996), which is also known as the “golden mean rule” (Jansen and 
Lifbroer 2006) is used, the two partners have equal influence in negotiations. When the 
“sphere of interest rule” (Croijn 1996;  Jansen  and  Lifbroer 2006) is applied, the 
woman’s influence is stronger than the man’s because the birth of a child is seen as 
being in her “sphere of interest.” In case of the “social drift rule” (Jansen and Lifbroer 
2006) disagreement leads to a continuation of the status quo. According to Jansen and 
Liefbroer (2006), couples can also apply a “power rule,” under which the partner with 
the greater economic resources makes the decision. More detailed versions of these 
rules have also been identified in dyadic fertility research, according to Bauer and 
Kneip (2013): e.g., the “sphere of interest rule” has been redefined as the “joint utility 
model”  or the “matriarchal model;”  while the  “power rule” has been called the 
“patriarchal model” or the “power rule model.”  
The major challenge for couples with corresponding  desires  is the temporal 
coordination of parenthood within their own biographies. Thus, the decision within a 
partnership about whether to start a family can be viewed as a result of an interaction 
process. The interaction process is a process of influence, agreement, convergence, and 
divergence (Oppitz 1990; von Rosenstiel et al. 1986). Although it can be assumed that 
the interdependence of the partners plays a very important role in the decision-making 
process, until now this factor has not been prominent in the theoretical discussion. As 
parenthood is the result of a decision that is made within the partnership (Burkart 1994, 
2002; Klein 2003; Thomson and Hoem 1998), it incorporates the living conditions and 
preferences of both partners.  
Moreover, it appears that the economic explanations for reproductive behaviour 
can be problematic (Becker 1960, 1981; Leibenstein 1975). In most of these studies, a 
partnership is viewed as a decision unit in which the partners try to maximise the utility 
of their household with their available resources. In this context, children are viewed as 
consumer goods that generate certain profits and costs. But the costs and the benefits 
that result from decisions regarding whether to have children and how many to have are 
uncertain and incalculable. Even if the realised costs and benefits were certain and 
calculable, we still would not know how they were distributed between the partners 
(Huinink 1995). Furthermore,  we cannot assume that an internal consensus exists a 
priori, as the household utility maximisation model implies. For this to be the case, the Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 63 
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costs and benefits of having children would have to be the same for both partners (Ott 
1989a). Auspurg and Abraham (2007) showed that in a heterosexual relationship, both 
the man and the woman differentiate between their own and their partner’s benefits. 
They also emphasised that the benefits are not subsumed under common budgetary 
benefits (Auspurg and Abraham 2007). 
It therefore seems both plausible and reasonable to assume that the reproductive 
decision of the couple is based on the previous individual decisions of both partners 
(Borchardt and Stöbel-Richter 2004; Burkart 1994). In addition, the couple’s fertility 
intentions can be understood as a reflection of the individual decisions of each of the 
partners. This individual-theoretical approach is based on the idea that the preferences 
can both converge and diverge. The result of the individual decision is itself determined 
by different factors (Burkart 1994), such as by the individual-rational considerations of 
parenthood  (Beck-Gernsheim 1983, 1997; Huinink 1995, 2000; Schaeper  and  Kühn 
2000; Schmitt 2004). 
Like the individual fertility intention, the individual cost-benefit analysis of 
parenthood is a temporal process subject to changing conditions. The assumption that 
preferences are stable is therefore untenable. It is necessary to differentiate between the 
stages in the decision to have a child, especially in the case of parity. The modelling of 
fertility behaviour as a unique decisive act ignores the possibility of internal dissent as 
well as the dynamism of the decision-making process,  which  is implied in each 
individual biographic change. Therefore, it has been argued that fertility behaviour is 
the result of a sequential decision-making process, and requires dynamic modelling 
(Kohlmann and Kopp 1997). 
The parenthood decision is made with the input of both of the partners, and the 
preference of each of the partners should be seen as equally relevant. Hence, dyadic 
modelling requires the simultaneous consideration of the living conditions of each of 
the partners, their individual life options, and their individual life plans. In the context 
of the partnership, these conditions and preferences must be adapted to each other. The 
dyadic decision therefore shows the result of an internal interaction process. 
In  the  literature,  there are models  that  consider the interaction the  negotiation 
processes within the reproductive decision-making process in a partnership (Klaus and 
Suckow 2005). Thus, the socio-economic model of Turchi (1981) and the motivational-
psychological individual model posit an effect of the behavioural intention of the male 
partner on the female partner’s desire to have a child. It appears that the approval of 
certain attachment figures, particularly the approval of the partner, plays a large role in 
decision-making regarding reproduction. This influence is interpreted implicitly as a 
pair interaction and can be an important factor in explaining the reproductive behaviour 
of the couple (von Rosenstiel et al. 1986). Stein, Willen & Pavetic: Couples’ decision making on fertility 
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In addition,  there  is  a number  of models which explicitly  contain the pair 
interaction within the scope of a dyadic decision-making process. A good illustration of 
this is the decision-making process in Hass’ (1974) model. His model contains three 
successive  stages of  fertility  decisions.  The model differentiates  between fertility 
decisions  before conception, during pregnancy,  and after birth. At each stage the 
generative decision and the behaviour are modelled as an interaction between the two 
partners.  
The model by  Beckman (1977, 1979) defines  the  interaction  process  as a 
bargaining process in which the two partners negotiate on the basis of their individual 
intentions. Each partner proposes a course of action which may generate consensus or 
dissent. The bargaining process is defined by the persuasive power of each actor. This 
power determines the potential for conflict resolution (Borchardt and Stöbel-Richter 
2004). Another model is the expansion of the motivation-psychological model of von 
Rosenstiel et al. (1986). It also examines the couple’s interaction as a dyadic decision-
making process. It is the first model to take into account the mutual influence of the two 
partners on the decision to have a child. Other components of the interaction process 
include  communication, penetration, correspondence, adjustment,  and dissociation. 
These components have effects on the attitudes of the partners. Indeed, the interaction 
process is examined only implicitly.  Thus, the behavioural intentions, but not the 
attitudes  of  the  partners  are  considered.  The  model is therefore  only  suitable for 
explaining the dyadic decision-making process of couples who finally agreed. 
Attempts have occasionally been  made to model and empirically  evaluate 
decisions made by two or more actors from a bargaining perspective (Auspurg and 
Abraham 2007; Beblo  2001; Bernasco and  Giesen 2000; Brines and  Joyner  1999; 
Kohlmann and Kopp 1997). These studies are based on the bargaining model suggested 
by Ott (1989a, b, 1992, 1995, 2001). In this research the decision to become a parent is 
discussed  as a central theme within the context of the allocation of responsibilities 
within the partnership, taking into account the individual cost-benefit analysis of both 
of the partners. The outcome of the negotiation process is determined by the negotiating 
positions as well as by the negotiating  strength of both partners. They  essentially 
depend on external cost-benefit considerations, as well as on the alternative options of 
action. 
Given the increased educational and labour force participation levels of women, 
the negotiating power within partnerships  is  becoming  increasingly  symmetrical. 
Having a high-level professional position considerably reduces a woman’s chances of 
starting a family (Kohlmann and Kopp 1997). On the other hand, a woman may scale 
back her career ambitions when she starts a family. Hence, the decision to become a 
parent often leads to an impairment of the woman’s negotiating position (Ott 1989a). Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 63 
http://www.demographic-research.org   1703 
The recent changes in fertility behaviour can be linked to increased opportunity 
costs for women of having children given the improvements in their educational and 
vocational conditions. On the one hand, the negotiation process suggests that there is a 
close connection between the decision to become a parent and the extent to which 
childrearing responsibilities are allocated in a fair way in the relationship. On the other 
hand, the negotiation process shows that the partners are seeking solutions to minimise 
the individual economic risks of parenthood. 
These factors influence the couple’s intentions, as well as the decision itself. We 
therefore assume that benefits and costs are linked to parenthood. In addition to the 
situation-dependent conditions that tend to either encourage or discourage childbearing, 
each partner’s assessment of the benefits and the costs influence his or her intentions. 
We also assume that this cost-benefit analysis by each of the partners has an indirect 
influence on the decision within a partnership. The assessments of each of the partners 
may generate consensus or dissent at the level of behaviour. 
Even if the partners agree that they want to have a child, the optimum timing of 
parenthood is a central issue that must be addressed. In addition, the biographies of both 
of the partners and of their aims in life must be negotiated. Diverging views must be 
resolved with compromise. 
The couple’s interactions are important components of their fertility behaviour. 
The behavioural intentions of both partners must correspond not only in terms of their 
joint decisions. The decision-making process also implies the reciprocal influence of 
both of the partners at the intentional level, which leads to a decision being reached. 
The decision is therefore based on a complex interaction process in which both of the 
partners exert influence. 
The interaction process is integrated into a context. Parenthood implies long-term 
restrictions in individual life options. The life options of both of the partners are in turn 
connected to their structural conditions to have a child (Huinink 1995), their individual 
living conditions, and their personal goals. Previous decisions made in central areas of 
life are also important, such as educational and occupational choices (Burkart 1994; 
Huinink 1990; Namboodiri 1979). From an individual point of view, changes in life and 
in the availability of options  affect  the desire to have a child.  Changes in fertility 
behaviour and changes in an individual’s living conditions are mutually interrelated, as 
the person’s fertility intention  also may change over time as a function of his or her 
family situation (Rasaul 1993; Ruokolainen and Notkola 2002; Schoen et al. 1999). 
The desire to have a child is a goal that lies in the future (Ruckdeschel 2007: 213). 
It is influenced by individual characteristics, like the person’s values, his or her socio-
demographic  characteristics,  and  his or her economic circumstances (Kemkes-
Grottenthaler 2004). Especially for men, the most important factor is the existence of a 
partnership and its length (Klein 2003).  Stein, Willen & Pavetic: Couples’ decision making on fertility 
1704   http://www.demographic-research.org 
In this research,  we estimate a model which considers the mutual and the 
individual influences of the male partner’s and the female partner’s characteristics on 
the desire to have a child, and the relative strength of these influences in the decision-
making process. The model represents a framework within which this decision-making 
process is embedded. 
 
 
3. Modelling couples’ fertility decisions 
In this paper we model in a dyadic way the family formation and extension process in 
order to show the attitudes as well as the behavioural intentions of both the female and 
the  male partner. We assume  that the fertility intentions  of both of the partners 
influence their joint decision. The transition to having a child will be presented as the 
result of an interaction process in which the partners influence each other and the result 
of the decision to varying degrees. Also relevant to the decision-making process is the 
personal context of a couple, including their individual characteristics, such as the value 
they assign to children, their education, and the number of hours they work per week; as 
well as their partnership characteristics, such as the duration of their relationship and 
their marital status. These characteristics affect the attitudes of individuals, and thus, 
indirectly, their decision. The couple’s final decision about whether to have a child is a 
result of the combined fertility intentins of both the man and the woman. Figure 1 
shows the components and their (in-) direct relations of the decision-making process. 
 
Figure 1:  Decision-making process for having a child 
 Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 63 
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Up to now there have been few  attempts in the empirical literature to model 
fertility decisions  as  resulting from an  interaction process between two individuals 
within a partnership. This is because there have only been few datasets which include 
the changing characteristics of both partners. There are, however, appropriate German-
language data from the “Bamberger Married Couple Panel” and the “Panel Analysis of 
Intimate Relationships and Family Dynamics” (pairfam). Furthermore, from a statistical 
point of view, modelling of these  decision-making processes is difficult, and is 
associated with a number of problems. First, there are problems related to assessing the 
relative influence of the fertility intentions of each of the partners. Second, it is difficult 
to measure the relative influence of common items for each fertility intention . Third, it 
is hard to assess  the  extent to which  the partners influence  each other’s fertility 
intentions. Finally, it is difficult to determine the influence on the couple’s decision of 
each of the partners moderated by their characteristics. 
The underlying formally specified model for analysing the decision-making 
process is a multivariate non-linear probit model. Our model specifies three endogenous 
variables: first, the fertility intention of the female partner; second, the fertility intention 
of the male partner; and, third, the result of their common decision. 
When we examine the process of having  a (further) child from a couple’s 
perspective, the interesting question of how each partner influences the couple’s final 
decision arises. Thomson (1997:344) outlined two basic options. On the one hand, the 
female partner may have more influence over the final decision because she bears the 
physical costs of pregnancy and birth. On the other hand, the man may have more 
influence because he earns a greater share of the income. It is also possible that the 
partners have equal levels of influence. Based on data from Sweden and the USA, 
Thomson and Hoem (1998) found an egalitarian effect on the final decision using a 
dyadic measurement. However, based on their analyses of the Bamberger married 
couple panel data, Pavetic (2009) and also Stein and Pavetic (2011, 2013) asserted that 
the woman dominates the decision-making process. In this study, we also assume that 
the female partner’s preference is more influential (Hypothesis 1). 
Some studies have shown that women in general have a stronger desire to have a 
child (Ruckdeschel 2004:367; Kemkes-Grottenthaler 2004:193). This  hypothesis  is 
supported by the fact that a woman is  more intensely involved in parenting during 
pregnancy and shortly after the birth, which could have negative effects on her working 
career.  In  a  male breadwinner model  the man might have more influence.  As  this 
traditional model has been less prevalent among recent cohorts, we may assume that the 
man’s  power  over the couple’s decision to become parents (again) would have 
decreased.  Among the younger birth cohorts, the female partner is more likely to 
participate in the labour market. But as most women take a break from work during 
pregnancy and after giving birth, the man’s influence on the couple’s decision may Stein, Willen & Pavetic: Couples’ decision making on fertility 
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persist. We therefore have also to consider the availability of child care. For the most 
part, having access to a flexible child care arrangement should give the female partner 
more influence. But if in modern partnerships child care tasks are more equitably 
distributed, then men may take on a paternal role model that will make reconciling 
family and work important to them as well (Marbach and Tölke 2007:272). Thus, the 
availability of child care could have a positive effect on the desire of both men and 
women to have a child (Hypothesis 2). We therefore assume that as the woman is the 
partner who bears higher costs associated with pregnancy, she will have the greater 
influence on the final decision to have a child. 
In  analysing fertility behaviour we have to distinguish between  western and 
eastern German couples. Following the reunification of Germany, the former German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) adopted the political system of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG). Yet more than two decades later, differences in fertility between the 
eastern and western parts of the country remain. Because of the financial advantages of 
using the splitting tax rate and the fact that child care is often available on a half-day 
basis only, the male breadwinner model is still established in West Germany (Konietzka 
and  Kreyenfeld 2005). As a result, many West  German women  are  in part-time 
employment. In the GDR, by contrast, there was a huge demand for women to work 
full-time because of a labour deficit. To ensure their integration into the labour market, 
the government organised a flexible system of full-time child  care, often through 
employers (Bast and Ostner 1992). Thus, the breadwinner model in the GDR was more 
egalitarian, and even  now East German  women are more likely than West German 
women to want to work full-time (Dorbritz et al. 2005:11). But in order to combine full-
time employment and family life  after  reunification,  many women came to prefer 
having just one child (Ruckdeschel 2004:373).  This means  that there are  more 
differences between the two parts of Germany to be expected which have varying effect 
on the desire to have a child. If this assumption is confirmed, we will find differences in 
preferences even after controlling for work schedule and access to flexible child care 
(Hypothesis 3). 
As has already been mentioned, we assume that the woman’s influence on the 
couple’s decision is greater because the cost of childbirth is higher for her than for the 
man. The more time a woman takes off work for maternity leave, the less likely it is 
that she will progress in her career. A highly educated, ambitious woman is likely to be 
especially concerned about falling behind in her career, is therefore less likely to want 
to have a  (further)  child (Huinink 2000). Thus,  we assume that having a higher 
education will have a negative effect on the woman’s desire to have a child (Hypothesis 
4a). Even if we assume a more modern role allocation, both the man and the woman in 
a partnership in which the man has a higher education will generally be more likely to 
want to have a child. This is because the higher the education of the male partner, the Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 63 
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better his potential wages and the more willing the female partner will be to quit her job 
during pregnancy. We therefore assume that having a higher education will  have a 
positive effect on the desire of the male partner to have a child (Hypothesis 4b). 
Specialisation can occur even in egalitarian partnerships. In line with Schröder and 
Brüderl (2008:133), we assume that the decision (and maybe the desire) to have a child 
can affect  the work  schedules of parents.  This means that traditional forms of 
specialisation, like the male breadwinner model, may be accepted when a couple decide 
to become parents (again). Pollman-Schult and Diewald (2007) found that men may 
even intensify their work activities after having children. If this is the case, then the 
number of hours worked by the male partner should not negatively affect the female 
partner’s desire to have a child (Hypothesis 5a), and it may even positively affect the 
male partner’s desire to have a child (Hypothesis 5b). 
Most children are born in partnerships. Especially for men it is very difficult to 
have children without a female partner. If the man wants to realise his desire to have a 
child, he must be in a solid partnership. For the man, being in a permanent partnership 
provides him with the opportunity to become a parent (Klein and Eckhard 2008:381). 
But he is likely aware that if the partnership fails the child(ren) will live primarily with 
their mother. Thus, we can assume that decreasing pair stability will reduce the man’s 
desire to have a child (Hypothesis 6a). After a couple separate the children usually stay 
with the mother, and she is entitled to receive benefits. Thus, we can assume that the 
effect of pair stability will be lower for the female partner (Hypothesis 6b). 
Couples often get married because they want  to have a child  (Ruckdeschel 
2004:366; Eckhard and Klein 2006). Especially for men, entering into marriage is a 
strong indication of a desire to have a child. We can assume that before getting married 
the man will have carefully considered the quality of the partnership and decided that it 
was stable. In case of separation, however, the man’s rights as a father will be better 
protected if he had been married than if he had been cohabiting. Women’s interests are 
also better protected following a separation if she had been married. Thus, we assume 
that being married will have a positive effect on the desire to have a child for both the 
male and the female partner (Hypothesis 7). 
A couple’s fertility intention and the influence of these intentions on their final 
decision are the result of the individual characteristics and attitudes of both partners. It 
would be wrong to assume that the decision-making process is determined by economic 
costs and benefits only. We have to consider the normative and emotional reasons for 
having children as well (Nauck 2001). Eckhard and Klein (2007) found that women 
often have more intangible motivations for having a child. We therefore assume that 
women derive greater psychological and emotional benefits from having children than 
men. In line with Kemkes-Grottenthaler (2004:206f.), we found that women are more 
strongly identified with  parenting  than men, and  that  the  desire to have a child  is Stein, Willen & Pavetic: Couples’ decision making on fertility 
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determined by sociocultural factors to a greater extent among women than among men. 
The stronger the normative and emotional reasons for having a child are, the stronger 
the woman’s desire to have a child is likely to be. We therefore assume that the female 
partner’s desire to have a child will have a greater influence than that of the male 
partner (Hypothesis 8a). We further assume that the less distinctive these characteristics 
are, the weaker the individual’s intentions will be; and that this effect will be stronger 
for females than for males (Hypothesis 8b). 
For men, the direct costs of parenthood are more immediate. Because men tend to 
identify with the main breadwinner role, having a higher income may be associated 
with an increased desire to have  a family (Tölke  and  Diewald 2003b:354;  Kühn 
2005:130). We therefore expect that having a higher income will positively affect the 
male partner’s desire to have a child. Thus, we assume that the more income a man has, 
the stronger his desire to have a child will be (Hypothesis 9). 
 
 
3.1 Data and variables  
For our pair analysis, we needed  data in a dyadic structure.
4  In 2008, the German 
Family Panel (pairfam)  was launched as a multi-disciplinary, longitudinal study for 
researching partnership and family dynamics in Germany. Our analyses are based on 
data from the first four waves of the pairfam, release 4.0 (Nauck et al. 2013). A detailed 
description of the study can be found in Huininik et al. (2011). The yearly nationwide 
random sample size started with 12,400 participants for the three birth cohorts of 1971-
73, 1981-83,  and 1991-93.  The  pairfam dataset that also includes  married and 
unmarried couples. For our analysis, we matched anchor and partner data from the first 
two waves of the pairfam sample: i.e., 2008/2009 and 2009/2010. 
To measure the individual fertility intention, we used the item: “Do you intend to 
become a mother or a father (again) in the next two years?” We recoded the four-point 
response categories from “No, probably not” and “No, definitely not” as zero,  and 
“Yes, definitely” and “Yes, perhaps” as one. The same was done for the partner item. 
Both were taken from the first wave of the anchor and partner dataset. 
To measure the couple’s decisions, we used the following item of the anchor data 
from the second wave: “Have you tried to sire a child or become pregnant within the 
past twelve months?” This nominal variable was coded into a dummy. For couples who 
were about to have a child (i.e., the female partner was pregnant), the decision variable 
was coded one because a decision had been made. 
                                                 
4  This paper uses data from the German Family Panel pairfam, coordinated by Josef Brüderl, Johannes 
Huinink, Bernhard Nauck, and Sabine Walper. Pairfam is funded as long-term project by the German 
Research Foundation (DFG). Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 63 
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Starting with the individual characteristics, we assume that the decision to have a 
child is based  not only economic costs and benefits,  but also on  emotional and 
normative motivations. We therefore included the value of children in the item set. We 
first gave five arguments for having children: 
•  Having children will help you stay young longer. 
•  You can have very close emotional relationships with your children. 
•  Your standing in your social network will increase because of your children. 
•  Adult children will be there for you when you are in need. 
•  You will get new ideas from your adult children. 
 
These items were measured on a five-point likert scale from one: “not at all;” to 
five: “very strongly.” In each case a factor analysis reflects for the actor and for the 
partner the variation of one unobserved variable with an eigenvalue greater than one. It 
is therefore advisable to compute the mean indexes. 
We then presented five reasons for not having children, measured on the same 
five-point likert scale: 
 
•  You will be able to afford less when you have children. 
•  Children will add to your psychological stress. 
•  You will not be able to accomplish your professional goals when you have 
children. 
•  Having children can cause you to stand out in a negative way in public. 
•  Having children will limit your personal freedom. 
 
The factor analyses also reflect one unobserved variable with eigenvalues greater 
than one. It is therefore consistent to compute two mean indexes for the reasons not to 
have children. 
We assume that the stability of the partnership has an influence on the individual 
partners’ fertility intentions. This effect was operationalised by computing a sum score 
out of these three binary nominal variables: 
 
•  The partnership (or marriage) was in trouble during the past year. 
•  A separation or a divorce was considered during the past year. 
•  A separation or a divorce was seriously proposed during the past year. 
 
For example, if all of the items applied, the maximum sum score of three was 
reached. If none of them applied, the sum score was zero. This was done for the partner 
as well. Stein, Willen & Pavetic: Couples’ decision making on fertility 
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In order to measure the individual intensity of employment as an indicator for the 
specialisation gains for both partners,  we took the item that was asking for weekly 
working hours. To examine the effects of education on fertility shown in many studies, 
we used the Casmin classification index. We obviously controlled for the male partner’s 
and  the  female partner’s  age. The variables  were  scaled in years.  To identify the 
individuals who had already become a mother or a father, a variable was added that 
specifies the number of existing biological children. Because of the different scaling of 
the anchor and partner variables,  they  had to be synchronised.  We recoded the 
categories into: 0 = “no children,” 1 = “one child,” 2 = “two children,” 3 = “three 
children,” and 4 = “four or more children.” 
In addition to these  individual characteristics, we assumed  that some couple 
characteristics, like the availability of child care, would affect the individual fertility 
intention  of each partner. We took these characteristics into account by adding the 
variable “access to flexible child care options.” This item was included as a dummy 
variable and was taken from the anchor data. As was already mentioned, we assumed a 
positive effect of marriage on each partner’s preference. The couple characteristic of 
marital status was therefore included as a dummy variable. 
The duration of the relationship is also assumed to affect the particular fertility 
intention. To control for duration we added this item scaled in months. We also used the 
household net income to take into account the assumed income effect for the male 
partner.  To allow for a better interpretation of  the coefficients, the income was 
classified in units of 250  euros. To research the  potential differences in fertility 
behaviour between eastern and the  western German couples,  we used  a dummy: 
currently living in eastern Germany. 
In our analysis we focus on heterosexual and fertile couples. The  sample was 
therefore  adjusted by deleting homosexual and infertile couples. In a further step, 
individuals who had ruled out having further children had to be adapted because these 
participants had not been asked about their fertility intention. Therefore, for them the 
value of the intention variable was set to zero. As a consequence of this procedure, 
these respondents were classified as having neither a positive nor a negative attitude 
towards having a (further) child, although they had ruled out having further children. It 
may be  expected  that ruling out having  more  children would be  seen as having  a 
negative attitude towards having children. For reasons of questionnaire filtering, the 
intention and the decision variables of the couples in which the female partner was 
pregnant during the survey had to be set to one. We assume that with the pregnancy the 
desire to have a child has been fulfilled, and that the decision to have a child has been 
made. Creating dummies from this variable was  unproblematic  since we were only 
interested in the information about the desire to have a child. Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 63 
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In order to meet the requirements of the dyadic design, the actor and the partner 
data were merged and linked.  In  this  way  potential cohort design effects and the 
unilateral bias was reduced, especially for the couple effects which can only be taken 
from the anchor data.  To estimate a multivariate non-linear probit model, MPLUS 
forces the user to execute the listwise deletion method for handling the missing data of 
all of the independent variables. In order to avoid reducing the sample size any more 
than was necessary before estimating the model, the at-random missing values were 
imputed. The imputation was done in STATA 12 using the ICE command (Royston 
2005). The model estimation is based on 1,938 cases. Due to the dyadic approach, each 
case is on a pair. The following Tables 1a and 1b give an overview of the distributions 
of the exogenous and endogenous variables. 
 
Table 1a:  Descriptive statistics of the individual variables 
Variable    Mean female  SD female  Mean male  SD male 
Age  x1, x13  31.50  5.48  34.32  6.09 
Child  x2, x14  1.11  1.03  1.10  1.04 
Stability of Partnership  x3, x15  0.50  0.96  0.42  0.85 
VOC positive  x4, x16  3.48  0.68  3.48  0.73 
VOC negative  x5, x17  2.36  0.82  2.19  0.76 
Working-time  x6, x18  19.38  18.80  38.48  17.82 
Education  x7, x19  5.76  2.25  5.64  2.35 
Intention  y1, y2  0.39  0.49  0.39  0.49 
 
Table 1b:  Descriptive statistics of the couple variables 
Variable    Mean  SD 
East Germany  x8  0.21  0.41 
Married  x9  0.61  0.49 
Duration of Relationship  x10  102.97  66.66 
Flexible Child Care  x11  0.65  0.48 
Net Income  x12  14.00  102.08 
Decision  y3  0.19  0.40 
 
 Stein, Willen & Pavetic: Couples’ decision making on fertility 
1712   http://www.demographic-research.org 
3.2 Model specification 
We transfer our previous theoretical assumptions into an empirical model. We model a 
trivariate distribution consisting of the fertility intention of the female partner (𝗈𝐢𝛏), the 
fertility intention of the male partner (𝗈𝐢𝛐), and the joint generative decision (𝗈𝐢𝛑). 
These three characteristics are metrically scaled endogenous latent (response-) variables 
whose  operationalisation  is achieved through  the binary manifest variables (𝐲𝐢) 
described above. In addition, a set of exogenous variables (𝐱𝐢) of the female partner, 
the male partner, and the couple variables (like marital status) are taken into account. 
Figure 2 shows the model. 
 
Figure 2:  Effect parameters of the decision-making process for having a 
(further) child  
 
 
The theoretically assumed relationship  structure of the exogenous 𝐱𝐢  and 
endogenous variables 𝗈𝐢 is represented by arrows in the diagram above. The exogenous 
variables of the female partner’s influence directly the endogenous variable 𝗈𝐢𝛏 (the 
fertility intention of  the  female partner),  and the exogenous variables of the  male Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 63 
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partner determine the endogenous variable 𝗈𝐢𝛐  (the  fertility intention of  the  male 
partner). Moreover, it is assumed that the educational and occupational-biographical 
characteristics of both partners directly influence their fertility intention. Furthermore, 
the  exogenous couple variables (like the  marital status) influence each individual’s 
desire  to have a child. The couple variables are identical for the partners, but the 
variables could have different effects on the fertility intention of the female partner and 
the male partner. The effects of the exogenous variables on the attitude of the female 
partner are represented by the parameter 𝗄𝛏 to 𝗄𝛏𝛗. The effects of exogenous variables 
on the intention to have a child of the male partner are represented by the parameter 𝗃𝛏 
to 𝗃𝛏𝛗. The parameters 𝗂𝛏 and 𝗂𝛐 represent the influence of the individual attitudes on 
the couple’s decision 𝗈𝐢𝛑.  The different measurement points (𝐭𝛏 = 𝛐𝛎𝛎𝛖/𝛎𝛗  and 
𝐭𝛐 = 𝛐𝛎𝛎𝛗/𝛏𝛎) legitimize causality modelling. Since the decision to have a child is 
made by the couple, it is reasonable to assume that the error term 𝗜𝐢𝛏and 𝗜𝐢𝛐 in the 
male’s and the female’s attitudes are correlated (ρ).  
The statistical procedure we use to model the complexity of the decision-making 
processes in partnerships is based on the research of Sobel and Arminger (1992). A 
version of their model is applied in the modification here in order to analyse the fertility 
decision-making process in partnerships. To illustrate the dynamics of the generative 
decision-making process, we have to solve a number of identification problems. A 
detailed representation of the problem of identification and its solution can be found in 
Pavetic (2009), as well as in Stein and Pavetic (2011, 2013). 
We start from a standard regression model for the latent intentions: 
 
    𝗈𝐢𝛏 = 𝗄𝛎 + 𝗄𝛏𝐱𝐢𝛏 + 𝗄𝛐𝐱𝐢𝛐 + (…) + 𝗄𝛏𝛗𝐱𝐢𝛏𝛗 + 𝗜𝐢𝛏    (1) 
    𝗈𝐢𝛐 = 𝗃𝛎 + 𝗃𝛏𝐱𝐢𝛏 + 𝗃𝛐𝐱𝐢𝛐 + (…) + 𝗃𝛏𝛗𝐱𝐢𝛏𝛗 + 𝗜𝐢𝛐   (2) 
    𝗈𝐢𝛑 = 𝗂𝛎 + 𝗂𝛏𝗈𝐢𝛏 + 𝗂𝛐𝗈𝐢𝛐 + 𝗜𝐢𝛑        (3) 
 
Here, the parameters are denoted by 𝗄𝐣, 𝗃𝐣, 𝐣 = 𝛎,…,𝛏𝛗 and 𝗂𝐤, 𝐤 = 𝛎,𝛏,𝛐. The errors 
are normally distributed with 𝗜𝐢𝛏 ~ 𝐍(𝛎,𝗔𝛏
𝛐), 𝗜𝐢𝛐 ~ 𝐍(𝛎,𝗔𝛐
𝛐) and 𝗜𝐢𝛑 ~ 𝐍(𝛎,𝗔𝛑
𝛐). The 
standard probit model for equation (1), (2) and (3) assumes that:  
 
𝐲𝐢𝛏 = � 
𝛏 𝐢𝐟 𝗈𝐢𝛏 > 𝗕𝛏
𝛎 𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫𝐰𝐢𝐬𝐞
 
similarly 
𝐲𝐢𝛐 = � 
𝛏 𝐢𝐟 𝗈𝐢𝛐 > 𝗕𝛐
𝛎 𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫𝐰𝐢𝐬𝐞
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and 
𝐲𝐢𝛑 = � 
𝛏 𝐢𝐟 𝗈𝐢𝛑 > 𝗕𝛑
𝛎 𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫𝐰𝐢𝐬𝐞
 
 
It is possible to show that identification restrictions have to be placed on equation 
(1) to (3) to identify the parameters that are of greatest interest;  i.e., the regression 
parameters. 
In the standard probit model for (1), the threshold 𝗕𝛏 is set to zero and the standard 
deviation 𝗔𝛏 is set to one. Similar restrictions are 𝗕𝛐 = 𝛎, 𝗕𝛑 = 𝛎, 𝗔𝛐 = 𝛏 and 𝗔𝛑 = 𝛏. 
These identification restrictions yield the standard probit models: 
 
    𝗈𝐢𝛏 = 𝜸𝛎
∗ + 𝜸𝛏
∗𝐱𝐢𝛏 + 𝜸𝛐
∗𝐱𝐢𝛐 + (…) + 𝜸𝛏𝛗
∗ 𝐱𝐢𝛏𝛗 + 𝝐??𝛏
∗    (4) 
    𝗈𝐢𝛐 = 𝜷𝛎
∗ + 𝜷𝛏
∗𝐱𝐢𝛏 + 𝜷𝛐
∗𝐱𝐢𝛐 + (…) + 𝜷𝛏𝛗
∗ 𝐱𝐢𝛏𝛗 + 𝝐??𝛐
∗    (5) 
    𝗈𝐢𝛑 = 𝜶𝛎
∗ + 𝜶𝛏
∗𝗈𝐢𝛏 + 𝜶𝛐
∗𝗈𝐢𝛐 + 𝝐??𝛑
∗         (6) 
 
with 𝝐??𝛏
∗  ~ 𝐍(𝛎,𝛏), 𝝐??𝛐
∗  ~ 𝐍(𝛎,𝛏) and 𝝐??𝛑
∗  ~ 𝐍(𝛎,𝛏). 
The relationship between 𝗃𝐣 and 𝗃𝐣
∗ is given by 𝗃𝐣
∗ = �
𝗃𝐣
𝗔𝛏
�, between𝗄𝐣 and 𝗄𝐣
∗ by 
𝗄𝐣
∗ = �
𝗄𝐣
𝗔𝛐
�, and between 𝗂𝐤 and 𝗂𝐤
∗ by 𝗂𝐤
∗ = �
𝗂𝐤
𝗔𝛑
�. 
Technically speaking, 𝗄𝐣, 𝗃𝐣, 𝐣 = 𝛎,… ,𝛏𝛗 and 𝗂𝐤, 𝐤 = 𝛎,𝛏,𝛐 are only identified 
up to scales 𝗔𝛏, 𝗔𝛐, and 𝗔𝛑. 
This identification procedure poses some problems when testing the equality of 
parameters. These problems will be described and dealt with when necessary. 
To test the hypothesis that the influence of the female’s and the male’s fertility 
intentions are equal, i.e., 𝐇𝛎: 𝗂𝛏 = 𝗂𝛐, it is necessary to remember that only 𝗂𝛏
∗ = �
𝗂𝛏
𝗔𝛑
� 
and that 𝗂𝛐
∗ = �
𝗂𝛐
𝗔𝛑
� are identified. But if we use the formulation 𝐇𝛎: 
𝗂𝛏
𝗂𝛐
= 𝛏 that is 
equivalent to 𝐇𝛎: 𝗂𝛏 = 𝗂𝛐 we can see that 𝐇𝛎: 
𝗂𝛏
𝗂𝛐
= 𝛏 is equivalent to 𝐇𝛎 = �
𝗂𝛏
∗
𝗂𝛐
∗� =
�
𝗂𝛏 𝗔𝛑 ⁄
𝗂𝛐 𝗔𝛑 ⁄ � = 𝛏. Therefore, the non-linear formation 𝐇𝛎 = �
𝗂𝛏
∗
𝗂𝛐
∗� = 𝛏 should be tested. 
If  we want  to test the  equality of the  coefficients across  the  equation, that is, 
𝐇𝛎: 𝗃𝐣 = 𝗄𝐣, we have to remember that only  𝗃𝐣
∗ = �
𝗃𝐣
𝗔𝛐
� and 𝗄𝐣
∗ = �
𝗄𝐣
𝗔𝛏
� are identified. 
The hypothesis 𝐇𝛎: 𝗃𝐣 = 𝗄𝐣 therefore has to be replaced by the hypothesis 𝐇𝛎: 𝜷??
∗ =
𝗌𝜸??
∗ where 𝗌 =
𝗔𝛏
𝗔𝛐
. Again this amounts to a non-linear restriction on the formulation of 
the hypothesis to be tested.  Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 63 
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For analysing this decision-making  process, we have calculated a complex 
multivariate non-linear probit model using MPLUS 7 (Muthén and Muthén 2005).  
 
 
3.3 Inspection of the model fit and interpretation of the results 
Different models tests must be performed for different hypotheses. In the following, we 
present the results of the nonlinear probit model of Figure 2. Tables 2a and 2b provide a 
summary of the relevant model tests and the goodness of model fit criteria. We start by 
proofing the model fit. As can be seen from Tables 2a and 2b below, the root mean 
square of approximation (RMSEA) coefficient and the comparative fit index (CFI) 
indicate that the model has an excellent fit (RMSEA = 0.008 and CFI = 0.999). 
Furthermore, the statistic of the χ
2 difference test (Bollen 1989:292) indicates a much 
better model fit compared to the baseline model. The Wald test statistic indicates that 
the parameters fit the model. 
 
Table 2a:  Model fit 
Number of Cases  1938 
RMSEA Coefficient  0.008 
Comparative Fit Index  0.999 
R
2 Decision   0.623 
R
2 Fertility Intention Female   0.285 
R
2 Fertility Intention Male   0.648 
 
Table 2b: Test statistics 
Test statistics    df  p- Value 
𝜒2 Test of Model Fit  35.77  38  0.573 
𝜒2 Difference Test  3117.56  19  0.000 
Wald Test  968.66  40  0.000 
 
All of the exogenous variables combined are able to explain 28.5% of the female 
partner’s fertility intention and 64.8% of the male partner’s fertility intention. Together 
they can explain 62.3% of the variance in pair decisions, which also indicates a very 
strong R
2. Tables 3a and 3b show the first part of the model: the individual effects of 
the exogenous variables on the  female partner’s  and  the  male partner’s  fertility 
intentions. Stein, Willen & Pavetic: Couples’ decision making on fertility 
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Table 3a:  Individual effects on the fertility intention of the female partner 
    Parameter  SE 
Age  𝗄𝛏  0.040    0.010 
Child  𝗄𝛐  -2.053  ***  0.067 
Stability of Partnership  𝗄𝛑  0.142    0.037 
VOC positive  𝗄𝛒  0.880  **  0.050 
VOC negative  𝗄𝛓  -0.913  ***  0.039 
Working Hours  𝗄𝛔  -0.001    0.002 
Education  𝗄𝛕  0.153    0.016 
 
Notes: Level of Significance: *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05; + = p < 0.1. 
 
Table 3b:  Individual effects on the fertility intention of the male partner 
    Parameter  SE 
Age  𝗃𝛏  0.004    0.009 
Child  𝗃𝛐  -1.603  ***  0.068 
Stability of Partnership  𝗃𝛑  -0.280    0.045 
VOC positive  𝗃𝛒  1.142  ***  0.047 
VOC negative  𝗃𝛓  -0.876  **  0.045 
Working Hours  𝗃𝛔  0.030  *  0.002 
Education  𝗃𝛕  0.358  ***  0.015 
 
Notes: Level of Significance: *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05; + = p < 0.1. 
 
A look at  the effects of the  male partner’s  and  the  female partner’s  fertility 
intentions shows that both are significantly positive.
5 When we compare the restricted 
parameters, it becomes clear that the female partner’s influence on the couple’s final 
decision to have a (further)  child  is considerably stronger  than the male  partner’s 
influence. This means that the female partner’s intention to have a child has a greater 
effect on the couple’s decision than the male partner’s intention. We are thus able to 
confirm the first hypothesis that the female partner’s fertility intention has a stronger 
effect on the couple’s decision to have a (further) child. 
When we compare the individual parameters of the men and the women, we find 
commonalities in levels of significance due to the effects of the individual exogenous 
                                                 
5 For an overview of the whole model, see the appendix. Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 63 
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characteristics on the individual intention to have a child. The participant’s age does not 
show any confounding effects. When we control for the dependent variable with the 
number of biological children of both of the partners we can see that the influence is 
significantly negative at the 0.1% level. As expected, the estimation shows that the 
number of biological children has a greater individual effect on the female partner’s 
fertility intention than on the male partner’s fertility intention. Our assumption that the 
costs to women are higher than those to men due to pregnancy seems to be confirmed. 
Concerning  the stability of the  partnership, we find  no  significant  individual 
effects  for  the  male  partner.  As this is not the  expected  result,  we  have to reject 
Hypothesis 6a. The female partner’s  influence on  the  couple’s  stability is also 
insignificant. In Hypothesis 6b, we expected to see a lesser effect on the female partner 
than on the male partner.  
The indicators of the economic, normative, and emotional costs and benefits of 
having children show differences between the men and women due to their parameter 
significances and strengths. Starting with the positive values for having children, we 
notice a slightly more significant parameter for the male partner. Generally speaking, it 
appears that the higher the positive values attributed to having children, the greater the 
individual intention to have children is. Contrary to our expectations from Hypothesis 
8a, we find a greater effect for males. Hypothesis 8a therefore has to be rejected. 
For the negative values attributed to having children, the female  partner’s 
parameter shows a stronger and more significant influence. We are thus able to confirm 
Hypothesis 8b. It is interesting to note that the indicator for the positive reasons for 
having children is stronger for the male partner, while the negative value is stronger for 
the female partner. 
We did not assume a specialisation in the amount of time spent working. As was 
shown by Schröder and Brüderl (2008), such a specialisation must be a consequence of 
the decision to have a child. By applying controls based on the information on the 
existing children, a significant but weak effect of the amount of time spent working on 
the fertility intention of the male partner is found. An increase of 10 working hours per 
week  leads to an increase of 0.3 in the  male partner’s  fertility intention.  The 
corresponding parameter for the females remains insignificant. An assumed negative 
effect of fewer  working hours on  women is not found. As a result, we are able to 
confirm Hypothesis 5a. The effect of the male partner’s working hours is significant, 
but we cannot be certain that  it  is  large  enough to confirm our expectations from 
Hypothesis 5b. We suggest that a  further analysis should  be performed before the 
hypothesis can be confirmed or rejected. 
Many studies have shown a strong effect of education on fertility behaviour. The 
male partner is not concerned about having to take a break from the labour market to 
have a child. It can therefore be assumed that the combination of a highly educated Stein, Willen & Pavetic: Couples’ decision making on fertility 
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male partner and a less  educated female partner  has the highest potential for 
specialisation. But our model estimates a significant effect for the male partner only. 
We  find  a positive effect of education on the man’s desire  to have a child. This 
parameter is significant at the 0.1% level, and a value of 0.358 indicates a major effect 
of education on the  male partner’s  fertility intention. As a result,  we can confirm 
Hypotheses 4b, but must reject Hypothesis 4a.  
In the next step, we analyse the couple effects on the male partner’s and the female 
partner’s individual fertility intentions. Tables 4a and 4b show the couple effects of the 
couple variables on the female partner’s and the male partner’s intentions. 
 
Table 4a:  Couples effects on the fertility intention of the female partner 
    Parameter  SE 
East Germany  𝗄𝛏𝛓  0.136    0.080 
Married  𝗄𝛏𝛔  3.452  ***  0.081 
Duration of Relationship  𝗄𝛏𝛕  -0.023  ***  0.001 
Flexible Child Care  𝗄𝛏𝛖  1.911  ***  0.069 
Net Income  𝗄𝛏𝛗  -0.005    0.004 
 
Notes: Level of Significance: *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05; + = p < 0.1. 
 
Table 4b:  Couple effects on the fertility intention of the male partner 
    Parameter  SE 
East Germany  𝗃𝛏𝛓  0.434    0.080 
Married  𝗃𝛏𝛔  3.499  ***  0.083 
Duration of Relationship  𝗃𝛏𝛕  -0.029  ***  0.001 
Flexible Child Care  𝗃𝛏𝛖  2.170  ***  0.069 
Net Income  𝗃𝛏𝛗  -0.078    0.008 
 
Notes: Level of Significance: *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05; + = p < 0.1. 
 
Particularly striking are the similarities in the direction and the effect size of the 
couple variables. The access to flexible child care has a very strong positive effect for 
both partners.  As the male partner’s parameter is slightly larger, we can  confirm 
Hypothesis 2. It is thus clear that the reconciliation of work and family is important for 
men as well as for women. This insight is consistent with the findings of Marbach and 
Tölke (2007), which indicated that men also face work-family compatibility problems. Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 63 
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Living in East versus in West Germany does not appear to have much of an effect. 
Even after  we controlled for  working  time and access to flexible child care,  no 
significant effects were found. We are therefore unable to confirm Hypothesis 3, which 
suggested that East German couples are less likely to want to have a child than their 
western counterparts. 
The individual fertility intentions of the partners in married couples are found to be 
stronger than those of the partners in unmarried couples. We assumed  that couples 
marry because they want to realise their desire to have a child. The two effects are 
almost the same in size, and are therefore very convincing. This finding is in line with 
the results of a number of studies which showed that a marriage is seen as the best 
context for having children. We can therefore confirm Hypothesis 7.  
The couple’s  relationship  duration  measured in months is formally used as a 
control variable. For both partners, these negative effects are strongly significant. Thus, 
the longer a partnership lasts, the less likely it is that the partners will have a (further) 
child. However, the longer a relationship lasts the more likely it is that the desired 
number of children will be conceived.  It therefore appears that  the status quo  is 
maintained. 
Finally, on the common pair of variables, the parameters of the household net 
income shows no effects. Surprisingly, we have to reject Hypothesis 9. We expected 
our results to  correspond to those of  Tölke and Diewald (2003b). This unexpected 
finding  might be caused the fact that we estimated the  male partner’s effect in the 
context of a couple.  
In this research, one of our initial goals was to examine the influence of each 
partner in a couple on the other partner’s fertility intention. To do this we developed a 
model which was used to examine  these mostly unexplored partner effects on the 
decision-making process. Tables 5a and 5b show the partner effects of the exogenous 
variables on the female partner’s and the male partner’s fertility intention. 
When comparing the effects  it is important to take into account their varying 
impact. Only the male partner’s assessment of the partnership’s stability influences the 
partner’s intention to have a child. But this insight is not sufficient to reject Hypothesis 
6a. If the male partner reported a decreasing degree of partnership stability, it is not his 
fertility intention which declines, but rather that of the female partner. It is worth noting 
that  after  controlling  for  marital status,  the partner effect of the stability of the 
partnership continued to influence the woman’s intention to have a child. 
In the analysis of the partner effects no effects from age could be found. This is 
surprising as we would expect that with increasing age the fertility intention would 
decrease because of infertility after a certain age. But the effect of existing children 
influences  the person’s  intention  significantly. Both of the parameters show strong 
values, but the partner effect is stronger for the woman than for the man. The female Stein, Willen & Pavetic: Couples’ decision making on fertility 
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partner  bears  the physical costs of pregnancy; thus,  based on  the “sphere of least 
interests”  rule, her preference prevails.  Among childless individuals,  the  average 
desired number of children is 1.13 for western Germans and 1.19 for eastern Germans 
(Dorbritz and Ruckdeschel 2007:69). As the average numbers of desired children are 
low, it is not surprising that the estimated effects of our analysis are high. The existence 
of children may also explain the insignificant age effects. 
 
Table 5a:  Partner effects on the fertility intention of the female partner 
    Parameter  SE 
Age  𝗄𝛖  -0.063    0.008 
Child  𝗄𝛗  -1.211  **  0.064 
Stability of Partnership  𝗄𝛏𝛎  -0.526  *  0.042 
VOC positive  𝗄𝛏𝛏  0.671  *  0.045 
VOC negative  𝗄𝛏𝛐  -0.028    0.043 
Working Hours  𝗄𝛏𝛑  0.020 
+  0.002 
Education  𝗄𝛏𝛒  0.227  *  0.015 
 
Notes: Level of Significance: *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05; + = p < 0.1. 
 
Table 5b:  Partner effects on the fertility intention of the male partner 
    Parameter  SE 
Age  𝗃𝛖  -0.080    0.010 
Child  𝗃𝛗  -1.758 
 
***  0.071 
Stability of Partnership  𝗃𝛏𝛎  -0.188    0.039 
VOC positive  𝗃𝛏𝛏  0.917 
 
**  0.050 
VOC negative  𝗃𝛏𝛐  -0.830 
 
**  0.040 
Working Hours  𝗃𝛏𝛑  0.014    0.002 
Education  𝗃𝛏𝛒  0.129    0.016 
 
Notes: Level of Significance: *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05; + = p < 0.1. 
 
Only the female partner’s negative attitude towards having children influences the 
male partner’s fertility intention. Because of the five-point measurement scale, this 
effect is not just significant; it also has a highly negative value. The impact of this 
negative index on the female partner’s individual preference is very powerful, too. If 
the female partner has an increasingly negative intention towards having children, this Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 63 
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would serve as a temporary veto. Both the female and the male partner’s inclination to 
have a (further) child therefore decreases significantly, and the couple maintains the 
status quo.  
The effect of the number of existing children can also represent a temporary veto. 
Because our analysis focuses on partnerships,  we assume it is not possible  for an 
individual to have a child without the cooperation of the partner. Although measured 
separately,  this  interpretation of the effect only makes sense if the  partners have 
children in other partnerships. If they do not both want more children, the intention to 
have a child decreases among both partners. When the two partners are compared, the 
female effect is found to be stronger. 
The female partner’s educational level is shown to have no significant influence on 
her own or on her partner’s fertility intention. However, the male partner’s educational 
level is found to have a significant effect on the fertility intentions of both partners. The 
higher the man’s educational level, the greater the intention of both partners to have a 
(further) child. Thus, Hypothesis 4b should be provisionally accepted. 
The effect of the number of hours the male partner works per week appears to be 
similar. The more hours a man works, the greater the desire of both partners to have a 
(further) child.  It  should, however, be pointed out that the partner  effect of  male 
partner’s working hours is only significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
4. Summary 
Our analysis of the decision-making process of couples about whether to have a child 
using a dyadic model generated the expected results. The individual fertility intention of 
the male was found to be positively influenced by his weekly working hours and his 
level of  education.  The  partner effects of  the  male  partner’s  working  hours  and 
education on the  female partner’s  intention  to have a child  were  also  shown to be 
significantly positive. In the traditional male breadwinner model, the man is expected to 
work longer hours and have more education than the woman. In our analysis, we did 
not attempt to distinguish between starting a family and family extension. However, in 
a modern fatherhood family model, the male partner is expected to earn most of the 
family income. Our finding that the traditional male breadwinner model persists among 
couples who have had children should therefore not be considered evidence that this 
model is still dominant. 
In terms of the number of significant individual and partner effects, our results 
showed that the male partner’s effects were stronger than the female partner’s. But in 
sum  the female partner was found to have stronger parameters and temporary veto Stein, Willen & Pavetic: Couples’ decision making on fertility 
1722   http://www.demographic-research.org 
power over the couple’s decision. Which of the two partners has the greater impact in 
the decision-making process remains unclear. 
Particularly remarkable was our finding that the income effect was insignificant. 
We  speculate  that the income effect became insignificant in our model estimation 
because it was measured at the level of household net income, which cannot measure 
current costs like rent. In future research, the net equivalent income should be used 
instead.  It would also  be helpful to generate a variable that identifies the main 
breadwinner. This could be the couple constellation shown in Bauer and Jacob (2010), 
enhanced by the income level. 
Finally, the hypotheses and outcomes should be checked in separate models which 
distinguish between family formation and family extension.  This might reveal 
significant differences between couples from West and East Germany. In addition, it 
could be interesting to examine the breadwinner constellations of couples before they 
start having children.  A longitudinal model  using  data from more than two waves 
would not only expand the options for analysis, but could lead to more differentiated 
results. In the future, we plan to extend our approach using pairfam panel data as they 
become available. 
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Appendix 
Table A-1:  Model Summary 
  Female  SEf  Male  SEm 
Individual effects on fertility intention 
Age  0.040    0.010    0.004    0.009   
Child   −2.053  ***  0.067    -1.603  ***  0.068   
Stability of Partnership     0.142    0.037    -0.280    0.045   
VOC positive   −0.880  **  0.050    1.142  ***  0.047   
VOC negative   −0.913  ***  0.039    -0.876  **  0.045   
Working Hours   −0.001    0.002    0.030  *  0.002   
Education   −0.153    0.016    0.358  ***  0.015   
                 
Couple effects on fertility intention 
 
 
East Germany   −0.136    0.080    0.434    0.080   
Married   −3.452  ***  0.081    3.499  ***  0.083   
Duration of Relationship   −0.023  ***  0.001    -0.029  ***  0.001   
Flexible Child Care   −1.911  ***  0.069    2.170  ***  0.069   
Net Income   −0.005    0.004    -0.078    0.008   
                 
Partner effects on fertility intention 
  Age   −0.063    0.008    -0.080    0.010   
Child   −1.211  **  0.064    -1.758  ***  0.071   
Stability of Partnership   −0.526  *  0.042    -0.188    0.039   
VOC positive   −0.671  *  0.045    0.917  **  0.050   
VOC negative   −0.028    0.043    -0.830  **  0.040   
Working Hours   −0.020 
+  0.002    0.014    0.002   
Education   −0.227  *  0.015    0.129    0.016   
                 
Individual effects on decision 
fertility intention   −0.615  ***  0.140    0.395  **  0.131   
         
Intercepts 
fertility intention     −0.493    0.350    0.396      0.355   
Decision  −2.353***  0.542 
Correlation  0.850*** 
 
Notes: Level of Significance: *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05; + = p < 0.1. 
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